Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 4

Issue 2

2022

Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation
Lily S. Engbith
Yale School of Management

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons,
Macroeconomics Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Policy History, Theory,
and Methods Commons, and the Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Engbith, Lily S. (2022) "Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 4 : Iss.
2, 399-411.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol4/iss2/14

This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
journalfinancialcrises@yale.edu.

Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation1
Lily S. Engbith2
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
July 15, 2022
Abstract
To address the risk of capital flight to neighboring countries during the Global Financial
Crisis, the Indonesian government raised the limit on insured deposits 20-fold from IDR 100
million to IDR 2 billion per account (about USD 200,000). The President issued two
government regulations on October 13, 2008. The first was an emergency decree that
authorized the government, in consultation with the Indonesian Parliament, to alter the limit
in times of systemic financial distress. The second was a government regulation enacting the
actual increase, which has remained in effect since the crisis. All banks operating within
Indonesia, including branches of foreign banks conducting business in the country, were
required to be members of the IDIC and therefore covered by the guarantee. Covered forms
of deposit accounts included current accounts, term deposits, certificates of deposit, savings
accounts, and Sharia-based (Islamic) accounts. As a direct result of the insurance increase,
total insured deposits doubled to IDR 957.4 trillion between October and December 2008.
By year-end 2009, the IDIC had paid out IDR 557.6 billion to eligible depositors at 21
relatively small liquidated banks. Evaluations of the program were mixed: although the
intervention was seen as having contributed to the stabilization of the banking system, some
commentators suggest that the government should have enacted a blanket guarantee for all
deposit accounts, which had been in place between 1998 and 2006.
Keywords: Account guarantees, Global Financial Crisis, Indonesia, Indonesia Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan
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Overview
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008
severely impacted economies and financial
systems around the world, causing
widespread market liquidity shortages,
bank failures, and precipitous declines in
public confidence. Although none of
Indonesia’s banks were directly exposed to
US subprime mortgage markets, the global
contagion prompted an unexpected decline
in interbank lending, the depreciation of
the Rupiah, and a contraction in non-oil and
gas exports (Saheruddin 2017; Asian
Development Bank 2009). The government
acted swiftly to bolster the central bank’s
lender-of-last-resort
functions,
ease
liquidity through monetary expansion, and
strengthen the administrative and
coordinating capacities of the Ministry of
Finance, Bank Indonesia, and the Indonesia
Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC)
(Asian Development Bank 2009).

Key Terms

These interventions, however, did not
completely address the risk of capital
outflows from Indonesian banks to
neighboring
jurisdictions
such
as
Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and Hong
Kong, whose governments had increased
their deposit insurance coverage during the
crisis (Kariastanto 2011; Hadad et al.
2010). To promote confidence in domestic
banks, the Indonesian President issued two
regulations on October 13, 2008. The first
was an emergency decree allowing the
government to alter the cap on insured
deposits in the case of a substantial threat
to the financial system (GoI 2008a). The
second raised the limit from IDR 100
million to IDR 2 billion (about USD
200,000)3 per deposit account (GoI 2008b;
GoI 2008b).
3

Purpose: To preserve public confidence in the
domestic banking sector, prevent capital flight to
neighboring countries, and otherwise preempt the
potentially severe impacts of the Global Financial
Crisis on the Indonesian economy (IDIC 2009;
Hadad et al. 2010)
Launch Dates

Announcement: Oct. 13, 2008
Authorization: Oct. 13, 2008
Operation: Oct. 13, 2008

End Date

Permanent change to the
deposit insurance system

Eligible
Institutions

All banks that operate within
the territory of the Republic of
Indonesia

Eligible Accounts

Current accounts, term
deposits, certificates of
deposit, savings accounts, and
similar Islamic accounts

Fees

Existing insurance premium of
0.1% of the average six-month
balance of total monthly
deposits; no additional fees

Size of Guarantee

IDR 2 billion

Coverage

At year-end 2008, 82.6 million
deposit accounts covered,
worth IDR 957.4 trillion

Outcomes

IDR 557.6 billion paid out to
depositors at 21 banks by the
end of 2009

Notable Features

The government created the
legal authority to alter the
deposit insurance limit in
response to systemic risk

On Oct. 1, 2008, 1 USD = IDR 9,824, per Yahoo Finance.
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Because IDIC membership is compulsory for all banks operating within Indonesia, including
branches of foreign banks that conduct business in the country, the deposit insurance
increase was involuntary and applied to over 82.6 billion deposit accounts worth IDR 957.4
trillion (IDIC 2009). Eligible accounts included current accounts, term deposits, certificates
of deposit, savings accounts, and similar Sharia-based (Islamic) accounts (IDIC 2009). The
IDIC was initially funded in 2005 with a founding capital injection of IDR 4 trillion. It also
collects mandatory membership fees and quarterly insurance premiums, and earns
investment returns on its insurance reserves (IDIC n.d.b). Depositors in failed banks could
exercise the guarantee by following the procedures normally used in non-crisis times, which
could result in payments taking up to 90 days (IDIC n.d.e).
On January 13, 2009, the Indonesian Parliament passed Law No. 3/2009, codifying the
government’s authority to adjust the limit on insured deposits using the language of the
emergency decree (GoI 2009). The IDR 2 billion cap has remained in effect since its
establishment (IDIC n.d.a).
Summary Evaluation
While it is difficult to discern the effect of the deposit insurance increase in isolation, sources
provide mixed reviews. In a working paper, IDIC employee Herman Saheruddin (2017) said
that the central bank believed the increase in coverage had “successfully restored” stability
in the Indonesian banking sector during the crisis (2017). However, he finds “some evidence
of material increase” in risk-taking by private banks following the government’s intervention
(2017).
According to another source, the government was not entirely successful in stemming capital
outflows (Jameaba 2018). Some commentators therefore called for the adoption of a full
blanket guarantee, similar to that enacted in Singapore and Malaysia and to the guarantee
Indonesia had in place from 1998 to 2006. Basri and Rahardja (2010) demonstrate that this
difference in insurance provision led to arbitrage pressures. The authors also report that
Indonesia still experienced “flights to quality” as depositors moved their funds to large
private banks and state banks of any size, which deepened the balance of liquidity and
fragmentation in the banking system (Basri and Rahardja 2010).
Despite the improvement in bank capital, the decline in non-performing loans, and an influx
of third-party deposits, Indonesia’s banking assets and liabilities were slow to recover in
2008 (IDIC 2009). The IDIC directly attributed this phenomenon to the increased cap on
deposit insurance (IDIC 2009).
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Context: Indonesia 2007–2008

GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
converted to USD)

$432.4 billion in 2007
$532.1 billion in 2008
$1,860 in 2007
$2,167 in 2008
Data for 2007:
Moody’s: Ba3
S&P: BB+
Fitch: BB-

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system
Foreign involvement in banking system
Government ownership of banking system
Existence of deposit insurance

Data for 2008:
Moody’s: Ba3
S&P: BB+
Fitch: BB
$147.9 billion in 2007
$172.3 billion in 2008
34.2% in 2007
30.6% in 2008
100% in 2007
100% in 2008
58.8% in 2007
59.3% in 2008
23% in 2007
23% in 2008
Data not available for 2007
38% in 2008
Yes, in 2007
Yes, in 2008

Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Government of Indonesia instituted the deposit insurance increase
to preempt bank runs associated with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
Indonesia’s President issued two crisis-related regulations to increase the limit on deposit
insurance (GoI 2008a; GoI 2008b). Both cited the need to anticipate the effects of the GFC on
Indonesia’s banking system, including the potential for bank runs due to a loss of public
confidence (GoI 2008a; GoI 2008b). Observers considered the measure to be an attempt to
prevent further capital flight to neighboring jurisdictions that had decided to temporarily
adopt unlimited guarantees on deposits, including Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong
(Hadad et al. 2010; Asian Development Bank 2009).
2. Part of a Package: In addition to raising the limit on deposit insurance, the
Government of Indonesia strengthened Bank Indonesia’s capacities to act as
lender of last resort and eased liquidity strains through monetary expansion.
Although the direct effects of the GFC on Indonesia’s banking system were not as severe as
those in neighboring countries, an unexpected squeeze on US dollar lines and large capital
outflows did generate some concern about domestic financial stability (Asian Development
Bank 2009). Meanwhile, interbank lending suffered from a sharp decrease in market
liquidity, share prices dropped precipitously, and the Rupiah’s exchange rate tumbled (IDIC
2009). In response, the government enacted a series of stabilization measures over the
course of October 2008 to promote confidence in the financial system (Asian Development
Bank 2009). The package included strengthening Bank Indonesia’s capacity to act as lender
of last resort, easing liquidity through monetary expansion, and increasing deposit insurance
coverage (Asian Development Bank 2009).
The IDIC was also charged with the resolution and restructuring of PT Bank Century Tbk, a
systemically important bank, in November 2008 (IDIC 2009).
3. Legal Authority: The President of Indonesia issued two regulations granting the
government the authority to raise the limit on deposit insurance and then raising
it to IDR 2 billion per account. The Parliament formalized this power in 2009.
On October 13, 2008, the President of Indonesia promulgated Government Regulation In
Lieu of Law No. 3/2008,4 an emergency decree that allowed the government, in consultation
with the Indonesian Parliament, to alter the amount of deposits insured if there were a risk
that could reduce public confidence in the stability of the financial system (GoI 2008a, 3). In
its preamble, the decree cited the necessity of altering the existing law in light of the
destabilizing impacts of the GFC (GoI 2008a). It stipulated that the government could alter

4 A Government Regulation in Lieu of Law is a statutory regulation that can be stipulated by the President of

the Republic of Indonesia during a state of emergency (Hamzah, Narang, and Yusari 2021).
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the deposit insurance limit in the following situations, after consulting with the Indonesian
Parliament:
(a) There are simultaneous bank runs,
(b) There is significant inflation lasting more than a year,
(c) The number of insured depositors accounts for less than 90% of total accounts at all
banks, or
(d) “There is a threat of crisis which potentially leads to the decrease of public
confidence in banking and could harm the stability of the financial system” (GoI
2008b, 2).
On the same day, the President issued Government Regulation No. 66/2008, indefinitely
increasing the limit for each deposit account from IDR 100 million to IDR 2 billion (GoI
2008b, 2).
The Indonesian Parliament voted the emergency decree into law on January 13, 2009,
preserving the government’s ability to alter the deposit insurance limit as it deemed
necessary (GoI 2009). This legislation, Law No. 7/2009, noted that public confidence in
banking was critical to the stability of the Indonesian financial system (GoI 2009).
4. Administration: The IDIC was responsible for administering Indonesia’s deposit
insurance program.
Sources consulted did not specify any coordination between the IDIC and other government
agencies or private entities.
5. Governance: The IDIC was governed by a six-member Board of Commissioners and
a chief executive officer.
As the decision-making body within the IDIC, the Board of Commissioners was responsible
for administering the organization and determining its policies (IDIC 2009). The Board,
which was wholly appointed by the President and led by a chairman, consisted of six
individuals: three Ex-Officio members, representing the Ministry of Finance, Bank Indonesia,
and the Bank Supervisory Institution; and three IDIC officials (IDIC 2009). The chairman of
the Board and the chief executive officer were chosen internally among the members of the
Board (IDIC 2009).
All divisions of the IDIC were subject to internal examinations conducted by the Audit
Committee, as well as reviews by “external counterparts” (IDIC 2009).
Every commercial bank was obligated to submit detailed monthly financial reports, which
the IDIC used to calculate individual premiums (IDIC 2009). These reports also included the
bank’s balance sheet, a profit and loss statement, an administrative account, and a list of
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liabilities owed to other banks (IDIC n.d.c). Rural banks5 were similarly required to submit
semiannual financial reports detailing balance-sheet information, a profit and loss
statement, a list of liabilities owed to other banks, and a list of credits extended (IDIC n.d.c).
Commercial and rural banks were also mandated to submit deposit status reports on a
monthly and semiannual basis, respectively (IDIC n.d.c). Additionally, any bank that
experiences a change in administration, shareholder structure, or controlling structure must
also submit a report to the IDIC (IDIC n.d.c).
6. Communication: It appears that the Government of Indonesia did not widely
publicize the deposit insurance increase.
Sources consulted do not describe government communications or public reactions related
to the intervention.
In its preamble, Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 3/2008 cited the necessity of
altering the existing law in light of the destabilizing impacts of the Global Financial Crisis
(GoI 2008a). The government later reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining public trust in
the stability of the Indonesian financial system in Law No. 7/2009 (GoI 2009).
7. Size of Guarantees: The Government of Indonesia increased the limit on deposit
insurance from IDR 100 million to IDR 2 billion per depositor.
The government had implemented a blanket guarantee until March 2006, at which point it
gradually lowered the limit to IDR 100 million by March 2007 (IDIC 2007).
The monthly balance of total deposits generally increased throughout 2008 (IDIC 2009).
Total insured deposits doubled to IDR 957.4 trillion between October and December 2008,
which the IDIC attributed directly to the new insurance limit (IDIC 2009). The IDIC also
reported that it had paid out IDR 557.6 billion to depositors at 21 liquidated banks in 2008
and 2009 (IDIC 2010).
In the event of a bank failure, the IDIC calculated eligible insured deposits based on each
depositor’s balance on the date Bank Indonesia revoked the bank’s license (IDIC 2009). The
total amount included the initial balance plus interest (or return, in the case of Islamic banks)
and, for discount rate-based deposits, the present value with a discount rate as stated on the
applicable biljet (banknote) (IDIC 2009).

Commercial banks include foreign banks, joint-venture banks, privately-owned local banks, regional
development banks, and state-owned banks, while rural banks (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat) are microfinance
institutions that serve agrarian populations and do not provide payment transfers (IDIC 2009; Wasiaturrahma
et al. 2020).
5
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8. Source(s) and Size of Funding: In addition to the government’s founding IDR 4
trillion capital injection, the IDIC derived its funding from membership fees,
insurance premiums, and earnings on its insurance reserve investments.
In September 2005, the government established a new deposit insurance agency, Lembaga
Penjamin Simpanan (Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation), injecting it with initial
capital of IDR 4 trillion in allocated state assets (IDIC n.d.b). The IDIC has since received
additional funding from its compulsory one-time membership fees, semesterly insurance
premiums, and earnings on its insurance reserve investments (IDIC n.d.b).
The IDIC’s goal was to build its deposit insurance fund to 0.5% of estimated insured deposits
by 2010, which represented a target of about IDR 10 trillion that shifted each year as it
improved its data about banks’ risk exposures. The provision for insurance claims—its
deposit insurance fund—stood at IDR 5.1 trillion at the end of 2008 and IDR 7.3 trillion at
the end of 2009 (IDIC 2010).
The government publicly committed to lending to the IDIC in the case of a liquidity shortage
that resulted in its inability to pay deposit insurance claims (IDIC n.d.b). Additionally, with
approval from the parliament, the government had the authority to recapitalize the IDIC if it
were threatened with insolvency (IDIC n.d.b).
9. Eligible Institutions: All commercial banks operating within Indonesia, including
branch offices of foreign banks, were required by law to become members of the
IDIC.
The increase in deposit insurance automatically applied to all IDIC members (GoI 2008b). All
commercial banks, branch offices of banks domiciled overseas that conduct business within
the Republic of Indonesia, and conventional or Islamic rural banks were obligated by the
government to maintain membership with the IDIC (IDIC n.d.d). The IDIC does not cover
branch offices of banks domiciled in Indonesia that operate outside of the country (IDIC
n.d.d).
By year-end 2008, the IDIC had registered a total of 2,047 banks, including 124 commercial
banks, 1,792 conventional rural banks, and 131 Islamic rural banks (IDIC 2009).
10. Eligible Accounts: IDIC insurance covered all bank deposits held within current
accounts, term deposits, certificates of deposit, savings accounts, and Shariabased (Islamic) deposits.
Sharia-based (Islamic) deposits could take the form of Wadiah-based current accounts and
saving accounts, savings accounts or term deposits that adhered to the principles of
Mudharabah Muthlaqah or Mudharabah Muqayyadah and whose risks were borne by the
bank, and other Sharia-based deposits approved by both the IDIC and the Banking
Supervisory Authority (IDIC 2009).
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11. Fees: Participants did not have to pay additional fees beyond the mandatory IDIC
membership contribution and insurance premiums.
Each bank pays semiannual premiums equal to 0.1% of the average six-month balance of
total monthly deposits (IDIC 2008, 43). The IDIC does not require member institutions to
carry co-insurance or pay risk-based premiums (Saheruddin 2017, 5).6
12. Process for Exercising Guarantee: The process for exercising the guarantee
remained unchanged from non-crisis times and could result in payments taking
up to 90 days.
Following the revocation of a bank’s license by Bank Indonesia and the submission of an
insurance claim on deposits, the IDIC would initiate a verification and reconciliation process
for determining each deposit’s eligibility for payment (IDIC 2009). The IDIC then had five
working days from the starting date of the verification process to begin paying out claims
(IDIC 2009). However, the procedure for determining eligibility could take up to 90 working
days from the date of license revocation (IDIC 2009). The IDIC was required to announce the
date of initial claim submission in at least two nationally circulated publications (IDIC 2009).
According to Law No. 24/2004, as amended by Law No. 7/2009, banks could submit
insurance claims to the IDIC up to five years from the date of license revocation (GoI 2009;
IDIC 2009). Depositors looking to receive an insurance payout through the IDIC had to
provide official documentation to prove their identity and deposit ownership; those who
were unable to do so were deemed ineligible to receive compensation (IDIC n.d.e).
13. Other Restrictions on Eligible Institutions/Accounts: Eligible institutions were not
expected to adhere to additional restrictions as a result of the increased
guarantee.
The IDIC deemed deposits ineligible for payout if the depositor was considered to have
benefited “in an unusual manner” from their account—for example, by taking advantage of
interest rates that exceeded the IDIC’s published rates (IDIC 2009).
A depositor could also be ineligible if it had contributed in any way to the bank’s failure (for
example, if it was a debtor who held a nonperforming loan) (IDIC 2009). Depositors of failed
banks whose shareholders elected to undertake their own resolution and restructuring
procedures without IDIC assistance were also not eligible to receive insurance coverage
(IDIC 2009).

For more information on the membership contribution, please refer to Key Design Decision 8: Source(s) and
Size of Funding.
6
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14. Duration: The Government of Indonesia did not announce an expiration date for
the new deposit insurance limit.
The Indonesian program did not specify an end date (GoI 2008b; Saheruddin 2017). As of
June 2022, the IDIC’s deposit insurance remains capped at IDR 2 billion per depositor (IDIC
n.d.a).

408

Indonesia

Engbith

References and Key Program Documents
Summary of Program
(Hamzah, Narang, and Yusari 2021) Hamzah, Hanim, Agnesya M. Narang, and Anggi Yusari.
2021. “Legal Systems in Indonesia: Overview.” Thomson Reuters Corporation. Yale Program
on Financial Stability Resource Library.
Web page summarizing the main facets of the Indonesian legal system.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/18600
(IDIC n.d.a) Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC). n.d.a. “Deposit Insured.”
Accessed October 12, 2021.
Web page describing the various types of deposits insured by the IDIC.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/deposit-insured
(IDIC n.d.b) Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC). n.d.b. “F.A.Q.” Accessed October
18, 2021.
Web page addressing FAQs about the IDIC’s coverage and operations.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/faq
(IDIC n.d.c) Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC). n.d.c. “Member’s Duties.”
Accessed October 19, 2021.
Web page outlining member institutions’ fees and disclosure requirements.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/members-duties
(IDIC n.d.d) Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC). n.d.d. “Membership.” Accessed
October 12, 2021.
Web page summarizing which institutions are covered under the IDIC.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/membership
(IDIC n.d.e) Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC). n.d.e. “Reconciliation and
Verification of the Insured Deposits.” Accessed October 12, 2021.
Web page describing the process for deposit insurance payout once a bank’s license has been
revoked by the Bank Supervisory Institution.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/reconciliation-and-verification-insured-deposits
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
(GoI 2008a) Government of Indonesia (GoI). 2008a. “Government Regulation in Lieu of Law
of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2008 concerning Amendments to Law Number 24
of 2004 concerning Deposit Insurance Corporation.” PERPU No 3 Th 2008 ttg Perubahan UU
LPS.
Emergency decree allowing the government to alter the amount of insured deposits.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/18602
(GoI 2008b) Government of Indonesia (GoI). 2008b. “Government Regulation of the Republic
of Indonesia Number 66 of 2008 concerning the Amount of Deposit Guaranteed by LPS.” PP

409

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

No 66 Th 2008 ttg Besaran Nilai Simpanan Dijamin.
Emergency decree indefinitely increasing the limit for each deposit account from IDR 100
million to IDR 2 billion.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/18603
(GoI 2009) Government of Indonesia (GoI). 2009. “Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number
7 Year 2009 Regarding the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 3
Year 2008 Regarding Amendment to Law Number 24 Year 2004 Regarding Indonesia
Deposit Insurance Corporation to Become a Law.”
Law codifying the government’s authority to adjust the limit on insured deposits.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/law-republic-indonesia-number-7-year-2009regarding-stipulation-government-regulation-lieu
Press Releases/Announcements
(IDIC 2007) Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC). 2007. “Penjaminan Simpanan
RP 100 Juta,” March 21, 2007.
Press release announcing the increase in the deposit insurance limit to IDR 100 million per
depositor.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/18927
Key Academic Papers
(Asian Development Bank 2009) Asian Development Bank. 2009. “Proposed Loan Republic
of Indonesia: Public Expenditure Support Facility Program.” Asian Development Bank. Yale
Program on Financial Stability Resource Library.
Proposal detailing plans for a loan of USD 10 billion to the Government of Indonesia under the
Public Expenditure Support Facility Program.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/18591
(Basri and Rahardja 2010) Basri, Muhammad Chatib, and Sjamsu Rahardja. 2010. “The
Indonesian Economy amidst the Global Crisis: Good Policy and Good Luck.” ASEAN Economic
Bulletin 27, no. 1: 77–97.
Paper evaluating Bank Indonesia and the Government of Indonesia’s responses to the GFC in
light of neighboring countries’ policy actions.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/document/indonesian-economy-amidst-global-crisisgood-policy-and-good-luck
(Hadad, Agusman, Monroe, Gasbarro, and Zumwalt 2010) Hadad, Muliaman D., Agusman
Agusman, Gary S. Monroe, Dominic Gasbarro, and James Kenton Zumwalt. 2010. “Market
Discipline, Financial Crisis and Regulatory Changes: Evidence from Indonesian Banks.”
Journal of Banking & Finance 35, no. 6: 1552–62.
Paper examining the impact of regulatory changes on market discipline in Indonesia from
1995-2009.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/market-discipline-financial-crisis-and-regulatorychanges-evidence-indonesian-banks

410

Indonesia

Engbith

(Jameaba 2018) Jameaba, Muyanja Ssenyonga. 2018. “Deposit Insurance and Financial
Intermediation: The Case of Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation.” Edited by David
McMillan. Cogent Economics & Finance 6, no. 1: 1468231.
Paper analyzing the impact of the establishment of the IDIC on financial intermediation in
Indonesia.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/document/deposit-insurance-and-financialintermediation-case-indonesia-deposit-insurance
(Kariastanto 2011) Kariastanto, Bayu. 2011. “Blanket Guarantee, Deposit Insurance, and
Risk-Shifting Incentive: Evidence from Indonesia.” Munich Personal RePEc Archive 35557,
December.
Paper presenting evidence that the magnitude of risk-shifting incentives under the deposit
insurance regime is higher than under the blanket guarantee regime.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/18594
(Saheruddin 2017) Saheruddin, Herman. 2017. “Explicit Deposit Insurance Coverage,
Ownership, and Risk Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” Indonesia Deposit
Insurance Corporation. Yale Program on Financial Stability Resource Library.
Paper presenting evidence of a positive relationship between explicit deposit insurance
coverage and bank risk-taking, consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/18599
Reports/Assessments
(IDIC 2009) Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC). 2009. “IDIC Annual Report
2008.” Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation. Yale Program on Financial Stability
Resource Library.
Annual report detailing the IDIC’s operations, activities, and audited financial statements.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/18587
(IDIC 2010) Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC). 2010. “IDIC Annual Report
2009.” Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation. Yale Program on Financial Stability
Resource Library.
Annual report detailing the IDIC’s operations, activities, and audited financial statements.
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/18590

Copyright 2022 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this material or to receive
permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the Yale Program on Financial
Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.

411

